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VIVA CONDITIONAL FEDERAL SPENDING!
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS'
From the rise of the New Deal through the constitutional lit-
igation over the Affordable Care Act (ACA), conditional fed-
eral spending has been a major target for those who have
sought to limit the scope of federal power. There are a couple
of reasons for this.
First, as the Supreme Court narrowed Congress's power to
regulate private primary conduct and state conduct in the last
twenty years,' conditional spending looked like the way Con-
gress might be able to circumvent the limitations imposed by
the Court's decisions. Thus, members of Congress quickly
sought to blunt the impact of the Court's decision to invalidate
the Gun Free School Zones Act, as well as its sovereign immun-
ity decisions. In the first case, they were successful; 2 in the sec-
ond, less so? But there is a longer, preexisting trend of federal
spending conditioned on requirements that states must fulfill.
This trend has grown over many decades, beginning with the
New Deal, with some decline in the 1980s but a rebound after
that.4 And, perhaps surprisingly, even a number of conserva-
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1. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that Congress
lacked power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override state
sovereign immunity in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2012) (making it illegal to possess, in a school zone, a
firearm that has moved in or affects interstate commerce).
3. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke
It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 503 n.223 (2003) (discussing how a bill providing that
every state program that receives federal aid must waive its immunity under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act died in committee).
4. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-54 (1985)
(discussing the increase in federal grants to the States and the proportion of state
expenditures for which these grants account); 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
tive Republican governors have found themselves supporting
conditional grants-notwithstanding the strings attached.5 This
dynamic is not surprising-actors at each level of government
have an incentive to increase conditional federal spending.6
For these two reasons-the availability of conditional spend-
ing to circumvent the Supreme Court's recent limitations on
federal power, and the longstanding role of conditional federal
spending in the growth of federal programs-many scholars
have attempted to develop a constitutional basis for the courts
to limit the spending power. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
offered a number of hints that their jurisprudence might move
in the direction favored by these scholars. These hints were
particularly evident in the Court's aggressive expansion of the
notice requirement.7 The notice requirement itself operated on-
ly incrementally to trim particular exercises of the spending
power. But individual Justices and lower court judges suggest-
ed that a more fundamental set of limitations on the spending
power was on its way.8
In this context, the Spending Clause holding of the National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius9 (NFIB), looks like it
ought to be a big deal. It looks, at least at first glance, like the
taming of the federal leviathan that many conservatives have
been waiting for. It represents the first time that the Supreme
Court has ever held a spending condition unconstitutional be-
cause that condition coerces the States.10 Although cases before
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 311
tbl.471 (2012) (federal grants to state and local governments, 1990-2011 statistics);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 1125 tbl.Y638-651 (1975) (federal grants
to state and local governments, 1930-1970 statistics).
5. See Karen Bouffard, Michigan House sends Medicaid expansion bill to governor for
signing, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20130903/
POLITICSO2/309030085.
6. See MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 278 (2012).
7. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58
DUKE L.J. 345, 393-409 (2008) (describing the Court's expansion of the notice doc-
trine in Spending Clause cases).
8. See id. at 408-09.
9. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
10. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-08 (2012)
(holding the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional as coercive); id. at 2630 (Gins-
burg, J., concurring in part) ("The Chief Justice therefore-for the first time ever-
finds an exercise of Congress' spending power unconstitutionally coercive.").
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NFIB had twice mentioned coercion as a possible limitation on
the spending power, the Court had never invalidated a statute
for unconstitutionally coercing the States. In Steward Machine
Company v. Davis," Justice Cardozo's majority opinion suggest-
ed there might be a point where "pressure turns into compul-
sion." 12 But though he thought there might be such a point, the
Social Security Act provision that the Court considered did not
cross it, and the Court emphasized that "to hold that motive or
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties."1 3 In South Dakota v. Dole,14 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion quoted Steward Machine for the
proposition that "in some circumstances the financial induce-
ment offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' 15 But, as did
the Court in Steward Machine, the Dole Court concluded that the
condition before it was nowhere close to the compulsion line.16
So how much does NFIB's Spending Clause holding tame the
federal leviathan? Not very much. The Chief Justice's pivotal
opinion renders a spending condition coercive only in very
narrow circumstances: Where Congress takes a (1) very large
(2) preexisting conditional spending program, and (3) tells the
state that if it wants to continue participating in the program, it
must also agree to participate in an entirely separate and dis-
tinct program. 7 In those circumstances, there is coercion.
In the specific context of Medicaid, which is the largest con-
ditional federal spending program by far, Chief Justice Rob-
erts's argument is powerful, though there is room to quibble
even there.18 But any reading of NFIB as imposing more signifi-
cant limitations on Congress's conditional spending power is
inconsistent both with how Chief Justice Roberts described the
holding in his pivotal opinion and with the constitutional prin-
ciples that he said drove that holding: (a) governmental ac-
11. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
12. Id. at 590.
13. See id. at 589-90.
14. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
15. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co., 483 U.S. at 590).
16. See id. at 211-12.
17. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864-65 (2013).
18. See id. at 902-06 (exploring objections to the anti-leveraging principle).
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countability, and (b) ensuring that the current Congress can
continue to tailor spending programs in accordance with its
current view of what serves the general welfare.
Not very much taming is going on, and that is a good thing.
First, coercion, in the sense that the NFIB joint dissent uses it,19
is not really the right concept. The idea that states have a will
that is overborne by large offers of federal money raises serious
conceptual problems. What is the difference between an offer
that is too good to refuse and an offer you cannot refuse? Since
Cardozo, who discussed how this kind of inquiry plunges us
into "endless difficulties," we have understood the conceptual
problems with saying that, by offering a state too much money,
the federal government coerces the state.20
Even if one could get past the conceptual problems, the facts
make it hard to say that states are coerced by federal spending
conditions. Although some scholars argue that federal taxes
crowd out state sources of revenue, thus giving states no real op-
tion to refuse conditional offers of federal funds, empirical evi-
dence suggests that no such crowd-out effect exists. 21 States and
state officials are very much at the table in developing conditional
federal spending packages. 22 This is in part why the federal
matches-the inducements to states-tend to be so generous.
And, of course, a state can always say no, so the federal govern-
ment has to pay enough to overcome each state's holdout price.23
19. Nat'l Fed'n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2664 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the ACA violates the anticoercion rule in part be-
cause the massive amount of funding states were set to lose if they chose to opt
out was on a scale "quite unlike anything ... [the Court had ever] ... seen in a
prior spending-power case"); cf Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12 (holding that retaining
only 5% of the funds the federal government would otherwise grant to South
Dakota if it chose not to raise the minimum drinking age constituted mild encour-
agement, not coercion, and left the States with a bona fide choice, not merely a
choice as a matter of law).
20. See Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 919 ("[lIt is conceptually difficult to identify a
point at which the amount of federal funds at stake is so great that a state has no
realistic option to refuse."). See generally Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging Into
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
21. See Brian D. Galle, Does Federal Spending "Coerce" States? Evidence From State
Budgets, Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
22. See generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).
23. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why




In the context of Medicaid, every state gets at least half of its
expenses reimbursed,24 and many states get much more. This was
the case even before the Medicaid expansion that was before the
Court in NFIB. The expansion itself is even more generous to
states. The federal government will entirely pay for the individu-
als added to Medicaid as a result of the ACA for the first couple of
years, dropping to 90 percent by the end of the decade.25
States and state officials might not like particular conditions,
but those conditions are part of a package that results from a ne-
gotiation between state officials and federal officials-a negotia-
tion in which state officials have substantial leverage and in-
volvement. So the idea that this is coercion in the sense that the
federal government has overborne the States' will, which is es-
sentially how the NFIB joint dissent expresses the concept,
doesn't really work. That is why the most sophisticated critiques
of conditional spending, like those of Professors Baker and
Greve, focus on its homogenizing effects and its effects in limit-
ing interstate competition, rather than on overborne wills. 26
But even the more sophisticated critiques presume that if
conditional spending is limited, matters that are now ad-
dressed at the federal level will devolve to the States. Often,
however, the alternative to conditional federal spending is not
devolution but complete nationalization. In the context of
health care, the subject of NFIB, it would be remarkably easy
for Congress, when setting up Medicaid, to say, "Let's do this
entirely as a national program." 27 Medicaid is an insurance
program that the Department of Health and Human Services
could easily administer by itself-just as it administers Medi-
care. We have seen this precise dynamic play out in the context
of the ACA's exchanges. When the States have refused to par-
ticipate in or set up the exchanges, the federal government has
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(b) (West 2013) ("[Tlhe Federal medical assistance percent-
age shall in no case be less than 50 per centum or more than 83 per centum .... "); see
also Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures; Federal Match-
ing Shares for Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and Aid to
Needy Aged, Blind, or Disabled Persons for October 1, 2011 through September 30,
2012, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,082-83 (Nov. 10, 2010) (listing percentages).
25. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(y)(1) (West 2013).
26. See GREVE, supra note 6, at 327-29; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spend-
ing After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1947-57 (1995).
27. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 432, 473-84
(2011).
No. 1] 97
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
stepped in to set up those exchanges itself.28 Notwithstanding
the problems with the website the Department initially set up
for those exchanges, there is nothing in administering them
that cannot be done at the federal level.
If the alternatives are cooperative federalism or complete na-
tionalization-as they are for many federal spending pro-
grams-we are not choosing between conditional federal
spending and no federal program. We are choosing between a
federal program in which States participate and one in which
they do not. And there are good reasons why a federal pro-
gram with state participation is preferable. In particular, coop-
erative federalism allows individual states to mold the imple-
mentation of a federal program to local conditions. This can
occur through day-to-day state administration, as well as the
negotiation of waivers. Waivers, in particular, have grown
dramatically since the Clinton administration. 29 These mecha-
nisms provide an opportunity for substantial tailoring of feder-
al-state cooperative programs to local conditions, whether they
are factual conditions or different local values. This recognition
of local variation is important, and it would not happen as
readily if there were complete nationalization.
Of course, there are times when the alternative to coopera-
tive federalism is not nationalization. In those cases, if there is
no conditional federal spending there will be no federal pro-
gram. Because of collective action dynamics among the States,
many very worthy government objectives cannot be achieved
without a strong federal policy and financial role.30 These objec-
tives simply cannot be achieved at the state level, even if peo-
ple in most or even all states want to achieve them. That is the
point Justice Cardozo recognized in upholding the national un-
employment insurance system. Similar points apply to Medi-
28. See Samuel Bagenstos, The Legally Flawed Rearguard Challenge to Obamacare,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/11/the-legally-
flawed-rearguard-challenge.html.
29. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in
THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
227, 228-31 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff,
In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267-69 (2013).
30. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article 1, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 135-44 (2010).
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caid, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,3' and the
Federal Aid Highway Act.32 These statues are not perfect, but
they are all quite successful in significant ways, and we would
not have been able to achieve their objectives without a strong
federal financial role.
Of course, my assessment of this point depends on my nor-
mative priors, and those may differ from the priors of my con-
servative colleagues. But that only highlights the problems
with imposing a judicial check on conditional federal spending.
Rather, disagreements about matters like these are and ought
to be the ordinary stuff of democratic politics. One person's
race to the bottom is another person's interjurisdictional com-
petition. One person's effort to avoid collective action prob-
lems, or to adopt universal entitlements of national citizenship,
is another person's cartel. There is no way to resolve these
questions without making very contestable normative judg-
ments about what the proper objectives of government are,
what our nation is supposed to be about, and what citizenship
as an American is supposed to be about. Often, too, these ques-
tions cannot be resolved without making highly contestable
empirical judgments.
I would submit that the political process of debate, of argu-
ment, of deliberation, of pulling, hauling, and trading, is supe-
rior to a process of judicial fiat for resolving these questions.
And so I would submit that what the Court did in the NFIB
case, by not imposing aggressive limits on conditional federal
spending, was a good thing.
31. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79
Stat. 27 (1965).
32. Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956).
99No. 1]
